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Fairness before the Mechanism for  





1.  Introduction  
 
The UN Security Council established the Mechanism for the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals (MICT) in 2010, to ‘continue the jurisdic-
tion, rights and obligations and essential functions of the ICTY and the 
ICTR’.1 The MICT is comprised of two branches – one for the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which commenced its op-
erations on 1 July 2012, and one for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, which became operational on 1 July 2013.2 
Rather than being a body that carries out purely residual functions deriv-
ing from the ICTY and ICTR, it is more accurate to refer to the MICT as 
a new international criminal tribunal in its own right,3 insofar as it was 
established by a separate UN Security Council Resolution,4 and, as well 
 
*Associate Professor of Law, Swansea University, UK. 
1 UNSC Res1966 (2010) UN Doc S/RES/1966 para 4.  
2 ibid para 1.  
3 R Frolich, ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1966: International 
Residual Mechanism for ICTY and ICTR’ (2011) 50 Intl L Materials 323, refers to the 
Mechanism’s ‘potentially misleading name’; G Tortora, ‘The Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals: A Unique Model and Some of Its Distinctive 
Challenges’ 21 ASIL Insights (6 April 2017) <www.asil.org/insights/volume/ 
21/issue/5/mechanism-international-criminal-tribunals> refers to the two categories of 
the MICT’s functions, some of which are purely residual functions, while the others are 
temporary functions derived directly from the ICTY and ICTR.  
4 Whether this fits within the Security Council’s remit under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter is questionable; for a discussion, see G McIntyre, ‘The International Residual 
Mechanism and the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (2011) 3 Gottingen J Intl L 923 and A Skander Galand, ‘Was 
the Residual Mechanism’s creation falling squarely within the Chapter VII power of the 
Security Council?’, in this issue. 
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as carrying out the residual functions of witness protection,5 archive man-
agement,6 detention supervision,7 and responding to national authorities’ 
requests for assistance, it also has the power to conduct trials,8 re-trials, 
and appeals.9  
To date, just under half of the MICT’s decisions have been on pro-
tective measures for witnesses or requests from national authorities for 
access to information.10 Currently ongoing before the MICT are the re-
trial of Stanisić and Simatović11 and the appeal of Karadzić.12 The Šešelj 
case is at the pre-appeal stage,13 while the Hadzić appeal ended with the 
death of the accused in 2016.14 Regardless of the outcome in the Mladić 
Trial Judgment, expected in 2017, it is likely that one or both of the par-
ties will appeal the judgment, and those appellate proceedings will also 
be heard by the MICT. The Mechanism is also currently hearing three 
alleged cases of wrongful conviction by the ICTR,15 has issued a number 
of decisions on alleged contempt, and remains seized of two cases where 
the accused persons were transferred by the ICTR to Rwanda under Rule 
11bis but have since sought revocation of those referrals on the basis that 
they cannot receive a fair trial in Rwanda.16 In addition, the MICT deals 
 
5 Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, annexed 
to UNSC Res 1966 (2010) (n 1) (hereinafter ‘MICT Statute’) art 5. 
6 MICT Statute (n 5) art 27. 
7 MICT Statute (n 5) art 25. 
8 The MICT is expected to try high-profile ICTR fugitives Kabuga, Mpiryana, and 
Bizimana, if they are ever caught.  
9 Eg Prosecutor v Ngirabatware (Appeal Judgment) MICT-12-29-A (18 December 
2014). 
10 ‘Address to the UN Security Council’ Judge Theodor Meron, President, 
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals,  UNSC Verbatim Record (7 June 2017) 
UN Doc S/PV.7960, 6 (stating that 45% of the MICT’s activity comprised of this type of 
decision). 
11 Case No MICT-15-96.  
12 Case No MICT-13-55. 
13 Case No MICT-16-99. 
14 Case No MICT-16-101. 
15 These are: Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda (Case No MICT-13-33), Augustin 
Ngirabatware (Case No MICT-12-29), and Eliezer Niyitegeka (Case No MICT-12-16).  
16 Eg Prosecutor v Uwinkindi (Decision on Requests for Revocation of an Order 
Referring a Case to the Republic of Rwanda) MICT-12-25-R14.3 (26 April 2017); 
Munyarugarama v Prosecutor (Decision on Appeal Against the Referral of Pheneas 
Munyarugarama’s case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to Strike) MICT-12-09-AR14 
(5 October 2012). 
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with issues such as alleged breaches of ne bis in idem by national pro-
ceedings against persons formerly tried by the international tribunals.17 
This article seeks to examine the role of fairness before the MICT. In 
particular, it builds upon previous research in determining whether the 
highest standards of fairness can be expected of the MICT, in the same 
manner as is expected of international criminal tribunals.18 It then exam-
ines some of the main procedural amendments that have been enacted by 
the MICT as compared to its predecessors. Lastly, this article points to a 
number of fair trial issues that have arisen in the early practice of the 
MICT, and discusses some issues that are likely to arise in future practice. 
 
 
2. The MICT: Setting the highest standards of fairness? 
 
Over the lifetimes of the ad hoc tribunals, and since the inception of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), there has been a debate as to 
whether these international tribunals are obliged to set the highest stand-
ards of fairness in their procedural practices, or whether it suffices for 
their practices to be just ‘fair enough’.19 I have argued elsewhere that one 
of the reasons why we should hold the international tribunals to respect 
the highest standards of fairness is the simple fact that they actively de-
clare their procedures to respect best practices.20 Conversely, then, any 
derogation from those high standards opens the door to less than fair 
prosecutions in domestic courts, insofar as those national administrations 
can claim that their practices reflect the highest standards as reflected in 
the practice of UN-established international courts.21 
 
17 Prosecutor v Orić (Decision on Second Motion Regarding a Breach of Non Bis in 
Idem) MICT-14-79 (10 December 2015) found that the proceedings in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina against Oric, who was fully acquitted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 2008, 
were based on different charges to the ICTY charges against him, and so no concern as 
to ne bis in idem arose. 
18 Y McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (OUP 2016) Ch 5. 
19 Compare, eg, MR Damaška, ‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal 
Justice’ (2012) 10 J Intl Criminal Justice 611, with McDermott (n 18) ibid. 
20 McDermott (n 18) 131-142.  
21 See eg US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony 
on Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of Detainees for Violations 
of the Law of War, 7 July 2009 (arguing that anonymous witness testimony could be used 
because it was permitted before the ICTY.)  
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The MICT is no different to its predecessors in confirming its com-
mitment to creating an idealized model of fairness, based not on any one 
domestic procedural model but on a mixed or hybrid procedural frame-
work. In a recent public speech, the MICT’s Prosecutor noted that the 
‘fair trial is the cornerstone of any judicial process and that fairness is the 
yardstick by which any judicial system will be assessed.’22 Furthermore, 
the MICT’s website notes that ‘the Mechanism maintains the legacies of 
these two pioneering ad hoc international criminal courts [the ICTY and 
ICTR] and strives to reflect best practices in the field of international 
criminal justice.’23 It also emphasises that ‘a competent and vigorous de-
fence contributes to the Mechanism’s credibility and legitimacy in the 
eyes of the international community.’24 Thus, it is clear that the MICT 
firmly depicts itself as an exemplar in fully respecting the rights of the 
accused.  
Moreover, I have argued elsewhere that the ad hoc tribunals’ ability 
to refer cases under Rule 11bis of their Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
emphasises their role in setting the highest standards of fairness, because 
they cannot refer cases to national tribunals unless they are satisfied that 
the accused will receive a fair trial.25 Implicit in this condition is the idea 
that the trial received domestically will be in accordance with the same 
standards established by the international tribunal. Equally, the MICT 
has the power to refer cases to domestic jurisdictions, but again, only 
when it is satisfied that the accused will not be subjected to the death 
penalty and will receive a fair trial.26 
Lastly, this argument is supported by the MICT’s clear preference for 
continuity from its predecessors. At the time of the establishment of the 
MICT, there was some concern that the Mechanism would not feel 
bound to follow the precedents of the ICTR and ICTY, and that this 
might lead to a lack of parity in treatment.27 In practice, however, the 
MICT has emphasised the importance of the precedents set by the ICTR 
 
22 Press Release, ‘MICT and ICTR Prosecutor Jallow hosts a high-level roundtable 
on promoting accountability’ (2 December 2015) <www.unmict.org/en/news/mict-and-
ictr-prosecutor-jallow-hosts-high-level-roundtable-promoting-accountability>. 
23 ‘About the MICT’ <www.unmict.org/en/about>.  
24 ‘Defence’ <www.unmict.org/en/about/defence>. 
25 Rule 11bis ICTY and ICTR RPE. See further, McDermott (n 18) 151-155. 
26 MICT Statute (n 5) art 6(4). 
27 McIntyre (n 4).  
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and ICTY.28 In noting the importance of ‘normative continuity’, the 
MICT has emphasised that ‘[t]hese parallels are not simply a matter of 
convenience or efficiency but serve to uphold principles of due process 
and fundamental fairness, which are the cornerstones of international jus-
tice.’29 Thus, if we are to accept that the ICTR and ICTY were obliged to 
respect the highest standards of fairness in their procedures, then those 
same standards apply equally to their successor institution, the MICT. 
 
 
3.  Procedural changes in the MICT vis-à-vis the ICTR and ICTY 
 
Article 19 of the MICT Statute, on the Rights of the Accused, is al-
most identical to its equivalent statutory provisions – Article 20 of the 
ICTR Statute and Article 21 of the ICTY Statute. The only notable dif-
ference is the welcome addition of gender-neutral language in the MICT 
Statute – for example, ‘counsel of his own choosing’ becomes ‘counsel of 
his or her own choosing’. The MICT Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(RPE) are closely modeled on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the ICTY and ICTR.30 On their face, the MICT RPE may appear to be 
more detailed, being comprised of 155 Rules as compared to the ICTY’s 
127 Rules. However, those 127 ICTY Rules include additional Rules bis, 
ter, and so on. So, to compare, the equivalent to the ICTY’s Rule 92bis, 
92ter, 92quater and 92quinquies in the MICT RPE are Rules 110-113 in-
clusive, and thus the number of Rules in the MICT RPE does not suggest 
a more extensive set of procedural provisions than the ICTY or the ICTR. 
That being said, there are some notable divergences in the MICT RPE, 
and those are worthy of further elucidation below. 
The majority of changes in procedure between the MICT and its pre-
decessors concern issues of evidence and witnesses. Notably, Rule 32(B) 
 
28 Prosecutor v Kamuhanda (Decision on Amicus Prosecutor) MICT-13-33 (8 
December 2015) para 15. 
29 Prosecutor v Munyarugarama (Decision on Referral) MICT-12-09 (5 October 2012) 
paras 4-5. 
30 UNSC Res 1966 (2010) (n 1) para 5, ‘Requests the Secretary-General to submit at 
the earliest possible date, but no later than 30 June 2011, draft Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the Mechanism, which shall be based on the Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence subject to the provisions of this resolution and the Statute of the 
Mechanism, for consideration and adoption by the judges of the Mechanism.’ 
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of the MICT RPE introduces an explicit commitment to a gender-sensi-
tive approach to supporting victims and witnesses, which was not seen in 
the ICTY RPE. The commitment to pay due regard to the hiring of 
women in support units for victims and witnesses is removed in the 
MICT RPE, possibly reflecting the increased recognition of rape and sex-
ual violence as being a crime that can be committed against both gen-
ders.31 
The MICT RPE also contain some provisions on the preservation of 
evidence for the benefit of future trials, where a warrant of arrest has not 
been executed within reasonable time,32 and detailed provisions on the 
protection of the International Committee of the Red Cross from being 
compelled to disclose information.33 The ICRC’s rights in this respect 
were, of course, explicitly acknowledged by the ICTY in Simić;34 we 
might argue that Rule 10 of the MICT RPE is superfluous on that basis, 
especially in light of the Mechanism’s commitment to continuity, as dis-
cussed above. 
Unlike the ICTY RPE, the MICT has an explicit provision on trial in 
the absence of the accused, where he or she has made an initial appear-
ance but later refuses to appear for trial.35 This Rule is similar to the 
equivalent Rule 82bis in the ICTR RPE, but with some important addi-
tions. As well as the three provisos set out in Rule 82bis (that the accused 
has made an initial appearance; the Registrar has notified them of the 
requirement of presence at trial, and that their interests are represented 
by counsel), Rule 98 of the MICT RPE adds that the accused should be 
physically and mentally fit to attend trial and that he or she should have 
‘voluntarily and unequivocally waived’, or forfeited, their right to be pre-
sent at trial.36 This adds an additional layer of protection of the right to 
be present at trial, but further elucidation is not provided as to when an 
accused person may be said to have ‘forfeited’ their rights in this respect. 
 
31 Prosecutor v Bemba (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-
01/08 (21 March 2016).  
32 Rule 78, MICT RPE. The ICTR had a similar provision, in its Rule 71bis; there 
was no parallel provision in the ICTY RPE.  
33 Rule 10, MICT RPE. 
34 Prosecutor v Simić et al (Decision on the Prosecution Motion under Rule 73 for a 
Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness) IT-95-9-PT (27 July 1999). 
35 Rule 98, MICT RPE. 
36 Rule 98 (iii) and (iv), MICT RPE.  
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In addition, the phrasing from Rule 82bis of the ICTR RPE, that the con-
tinuation of trial in the absence of the accused will only be ‘for so long as 
his [or her] refusal persists’ has been removed, which is unfortunate.  
The MICT Rules also contain some notable changes to judicial and 
administrative arrangements, which depart from the practice of the 
Mechanism’s predecessors. First, the provisions on contempt are unique 
in that they allow contempt proceedings to be carried out before a single 
judge,37 while the ICTR and ICTY RPE envisioned that such proceedings 
would be held before a full Chamber of judges.38 This provision in the 
MICT RPE has clearly been influential – in February 2016, the judges of 
the ICC adopted a provisional amendment to Rule 165 of the ICC RPE, 
allowing a single judge to exercise functions that would usually be carried 
out by a full Chamber in proceedings on alleged offences against the ad-
ministration of justice.39 Further, the MICT has jurisdiction to refer those 
charged with offences against the administration of justice, as well as 
those charged with serious crimes within the jurisdiction of the Mecha-
nism, to national jurisdictions.40 This is likely to be significant, as Article 
70(4) of the ICC Statute envisions that contempt offences can be prose-
cuted by national jurisdictions instead of the Court.41 
The MICT also has a pared-down structure for judges’ participation 
before the Mechanism.42 Many functions that would have been under-
taken by a Chamber before the ICTY and ICTR are to be carried out by 
a Single Judge (or a Duty Judge) before the MICT, including rulings on 
 
37 Rule 90, MICT RPE. 
38 Rule 77, ICTR RPE; Rule 77, ICTY RPE. 
39 ‘Report on the Adoption by the Judges of Provisional Amendments to Rule 165 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (29 February 2016) para 3. 
40 MICT Statute (n 5) art 6(1). 
41 Art 70(4)(a), ICC Statute. See further, Prosecutor v Bemba et al (Decision on the 
requests for the Disqualification of the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutor and the entire 
OTP staff) ICC-01/05-01/13-648 (21 October 2014), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita 
Ušacka, para 10 (‘I am convinced that the Court should have decided not to exercise its 
jurisdiction and requested that a State Party exercise jurisdiction pursuant to article 70 
(4) of the Statute.’). 
42 Discussed further in A Carcano, ‘Of Efficiency and Fairness in the Administration 
of International Justice: Can the Residual Mechanism Provide Adequately Reasoned 
Judgments?’, in this issue.  
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non-disclosure;43 the initial appearance of the accused;44 granting re-
quests for the taking of evidence by special deposition,45 and dealing for 
requests for assistance in obtaining testimony of persons under the au-
thority of the Mechanism.46  
The foregoing analysis provides just a snapshot of some of the main 
procedural innovations in the MICT vis-à-vis its predecessors. There are 
other minor changes, including a more detailed Rule on the functions of 
the Registrar,47 and changes to the languages provisions in the Rules for 
the MICT.48 The above-mentioned Rule changes, however, illustrate the 
MICT’s clear desire to be a leaner, more efficient, institution than its pre-
decessors.49 However, as Carsten Stahn has noted, ‘“lean” justice should 
thus not turn into “cheap justice”’,50 and it is thus important to examine 
the status of the right to a fair trial before the MICT, and some of the 
main fair trial issues that have come before the Mechanism in its practice 
to date, and that are likely to arise. 
 
 
4.  Fair trial rights before the MICT 
 
4.1. Retrial and the rights of the accused 
 
One of the ongoing cases before the MICT is the retrial of Stanišić 
and Simatović. The accused were transferred to the ICTY to stand trial 
 
43 Rule 53, MICT RPE 
44 Rule 64, MICT RPE. Rule 62, ICTY RPE and Rule 62, ICTR RPE state that this 
role can be carried out by ‘the Trial Chamber or a judge thereof’. 
45 Rule 78(E), MICT RPE. Compare Rule 71bis(E), ICTR RPE.  
46 Rule 87, MICT RPE. Rule 75bis ICTY RPE envisions that these functions will be 
undertaken by a ‘Specially Appointed Chamber’, comprised of three judges of the 
Tribunal.  
47 Rule 31, MICT RPE; compare Rule 33, ICTR RPE and Rule 33, ICTY RPE. 
48 Rule 3, MICT RPE; compare Rule 3, ICTR RPE and Rule 3, ICTY RPE. 
49 See further, Carcano (n 42).  
50 C Stahn, ‘Tribunals are Dead, Long Live Tribunals: MICT, the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers and the Turn to New Hybridity’ EJIL: Talk! (23 September 2016) 
<www.ejiltalk.org/tribunals-are-dead-long-live-tribunals-mict-the-kosovo-specialist-chambers-
and-the-turn-to-new-hybridity/>.  
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in 2003;51 on 30 May 2013, the Trial Chamber issued its judgment, ac-
quitting both accused of all charges.52 The Trial Chamber found that nei-
ther accused could be proven beyond reasonable doubt to share the mens 
rea required for a conviction under the Joint Criminal Enterprise mode 
of liability, and that the assistance rendered by both accused towards spe-
cial units of the Serbian State Security Service was not specifically di-
rected towards the commission of the crime to establish liability under 
aiding and abetting.53 The Appeals Chamber found an error of law as 
regards JCE liability in the Trial Chamber’s failure to provide a reasoned 
opinion on essential elements of this mode of liability; it also found that 
the Trial Chamber erred in law by requiring specific direction as an ele-
ment of aiding and abetting liability.54 The Appeals Chamber therefore 
ordered a retrial ‘on all counts of the Indictment’ on this basis.55 It is 
worthy of note that two of the five Appeals Chamber judges issued dis-
sents to this judgment.56 
Before the MICT, the defence attempted to argue before the MICT 
that issues of both res judicata and ne bis in idem arose, insofar as the 
scope of the retrial extended beyond those allegations successfully ap-
pealed by the prosecution.57 These arguments were unsuccessful; how-
ever, the MICT was more convinced of the defence’s submissions on the 
presentation of new evidence by the Prosecution at retrial.58 The Trial 
Chamber noted the risk that allowing such new evidence would prolong 
the proceedings even further,59 and, mindful of the fact that the retrial 
effectively offered a second chance to the Prosecutor,60 it limited the ev-
idence that the prosecution could present at the re-trial to that originally 
 
51 Case information sheet, Case No IT-03-69 <www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_ 
simatovic/cis/en/cis_stanisic_simatovic_en.pdf>. 
52 Prosecutor v Stanišić and Simatović (Judgement) IT-03-69-T (30 May 2013). 
53 ibid. 
54 Prosecutor v Stanišić and Simatović (Judgement) IT-03-69-A (9 December 2015). 
55 ibid para 131. 
56 ibid Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius; Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Koffi Kumelio A Afande. 
57 Prosecutor v Stanišić and Simatović (Stanišić Defence Request to Stay the 
Proceedings until the Prosecution Respects the Principle of Finality and the Appeal 
Chamber’s Order for Retrial) MICT-15-96-PT (27 October 2016). 
58 Prosecutor v Stanišić and Simatović (Decision on Stanišić’s Request for Stay of 
Proceedings) MICT-15-96 (2 February 2017). 
59 ibid para 21.  
60 ibid para 22. 
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presented during trial.61 The Chamber accepted that there may be excep-
tional circumstances where the evidence relied upon during the original 
trial has subsequently become unavailable; the Prosecutor may be per-
mitted to present new evidence in such exceptional circumstances at re-
trial, where it is deemed to be in the interests of justice.62 
 
4.2. Resources for defence counsel 
 
At the establishment of the MICT, there were some concerns as to 
the sufficiency of arrangements for the payment of defence counsel.63 Mi-
chael Karnavas, himself a defence lawyer serving before international 
criminal tribunals, noted that ‘Under the MICT – this new “lean and ef-
ficient” tribunal – defence counsel are expected to do a good deal of pro 
bono work.’64 Indeed, it is worthy of note that Peter Robinson, counsel 
for both Ngirabatware and Kamuhanda before the MICT in their claims 
of wrongful conviction by the ICTR, is acting on a pro bono basis. Ni-
yitegeka, who is also calling for a review of his alleged wrongful convic-
tion by the ICTR, was assigned counsel for a limited period of three 
months to assist him in preparing his review,65 but the MICT refused to 
allocate additional funds beyond that period, recalling that ‘as a matter 
of principle, it is not for the Mechanism to assist a convicted person 
whose case has reached finality with any new investigation he would like 
to conduct or any new motion he may wish to bring by assigning him 
legal assistance at the Mechanism’s expense.’66 
While this principle that the Mechanism should not pay for legal as-
sistance for those persons whose proceedings have reached their final 
judgment has been repeated in other decisions,67 the MICT did grant 
 
61 ibid para 23. 
62 ibid. 
63 MG Karnavas, ‘The MICT Model: Panacea or Chimera?’ (26 September 2016) 
<http://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2016/09/26/the-mict-model-panacea-or-chimera/>. 
64 ibid. 
65 Niyitegeka v Prosecutor (Decision on Niyitegeka’s Request for Review and 
Assignment of Counsel) MICT-12-16-R (13 July 2015) para 14.  
66 Niyitegeka v Prosecutor (Decision on Niyitegeka’s Motion for an Extension of the 
Assignment of his Counsel) MICT-12-l6-R (27 May 2016) para 7.  
67 See In the Case Against Florence Hartmann (Decision of the President on the 
Urgent Request for Legal Aid) MICT-15-87-ES (29 March 2016) para 13. 
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some limited legal assistance to Florence Hartmann to remunerate coun-
sel for the purposes of assisting her in her challenge to her arrest and 
detention.68 This and the Niyitegeka experience show that the principle 
can be derogated from in the interests of justice, although arguably the 
extent of the legal assistance provided to both convicted persons remains 
insufficient. However, the MICT has proven to be more flexible on the 
question of funding defence counsel than the ICTY in the Karadžić case. 
The ICTY’s Registrar had determined, on the basis of two properties 
owned by Karadžić’s wife, that he had the resources to pay for his own 
defence. The MICT Registrar initially followed this decision, but the 
MICT held that the Registry had erred in considering itself obliged to 
follow the ICTY’s determination in this respect, and granted the accused 
legal aid.69 
 
 4.3. Monitoring domestic prosecutions of referred cases 
 
One of the MICT’s most prominent areas of fair trial practice to date 
has been the monitoring of cases that have been referred to domestic ju-
risdictions pursuant to Rule 11bis of its predecessors’ Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. Pursuant to Article 6(5), ‘The Mechanism shall monitor 
cases referred to national courts by the ICTY, the ICTR, and those re-
ferred in accordance with this Article, with the assistance of international 
and regional organisations and bodies.’ In November 2013, the MICT 
issued a decision on the monitoring mechanisms, where it set out expec-
tations for trial monitors.70 It established that trial monitors should pre-
sent only ‘objective information’ on possible impediments to or violations 
of the right to a fair trial and ‘refrain from including in their reports any 
opinion, assessment, or conclusions regarding such violations or impedi-
ments unless otherwise directed.’71 This is because it is for the Chamber, 
 
68 ibid para 16. 
69 Prosecutor v Karadzic (Decision on a Motion for Review of the Registrar’s Decision 
on Indigence) MICT-13-55 (24 June 2016) 4, 6.  
70 Prosecutor v Uwinkindi (Decision on the Registrar’s Submission Regarding the 
Monitoring Mechanisms in the Uwinkindi and Munyagishari Cases) MICT-12-25 (15 No-
vember 2013). 
71 ibid para 29. 
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and not the monitors, to determine whether the referral condition that 
the accused shall receive a fair trial is still met.72 
It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the MICT might one 
day find that the accused can no longer receive a fair trial in the domestic 
state and rescind the referral. Most recently, in the Uwinkindi case, the 
Chamber noted fair trial concerns, such as the accused’s inability to com-
municate confidentially with counsel, but also noted that these issues 
were being considered by the Rwandan authorities and, as such, were not 
‘ripe for current consideration as a basis for revocation pursuant to Arti-
cle 6(6) of the Statute.’73 On that basis, the accused’s request was denied, 
but without prejudice to any further requests, should the situation not be 
sufficiently resolved.74 This highlights a flexible and open approach to 
referred cases, and the MICT’s clear willingness to revoke such referrals, 
should a fair trial become impossible.75 
 
 4.4. Judicial independence 
 
One of the most unexpected and unprecedented fair trial issues to 
arise before the MICT has been the arrest and detention of Judge Aydin 
Sefa Akay, a member of the Chamber considering the alleged wrongful 
conviction of Ngirabatware, in his native Turkey in September 2016. 
Judge Akay’s arrest was purportedly in connection with a failed coup in 
July 2016, which was quickly followed by the arrest of some 50,000 peo-
ple, including lawyers, judges, academics, and journalists.76 Judge Akay 
was sentenced to seven and a half years’ imprisonment in June 2017 for 
 
72 ibid para 28. See further, H Bubacar Jallow, ‘Rule 11bis: The ICTR Legacy in 
Rwanda’ in C Riziki Majinge (ed), Rule of Law Through Human Rights and International 
Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Adama Dieng (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 
2015) 106. 
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ring a Case to the Republic of Rwanda) MICT-12-25-RI4.3 (26 April 2017) 4.  
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75 See also O Windridge, ‘Gone But Not Forgotten–The Ongoing Case of Jean 
Uwinkindi at the ICTR and MICT’ Opinio Juris (29 July 2015) <http://opiniojuris.org/ 
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76 ‘Turkey arrests Amnesty International head and lawyers in Gulenist sweep’ The 
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‘membership of a terrorist organisation’,77 despite the fact that he is enti-
tled to diplomatic immunity,78 described as ‘cornerstone of an independ-
ent international judiciary, as envisaged by the United Nations’.79 The 
MICT has held that Turkey has failed to comply with its obligations un-
der Article 28 of the Statute, and has referred the matter to the UN Se-
curity Council,80 but to date, no action has been taken. Since Judge 
Akay’s detention, proceedings in the Ngirabatware case have remained at 
a standstill.81 The frustration of President Meron, in his June 2017 ap-
pearance before the Security Council, was palpable, but the Security 
Council has thus far been unwilling to intervene in the matter against 
Turkey. Meanwhile, Ngirabatware, who maintains his innocence, has 
been imprisoned, and his application for provisional release failed be-
cause the MICT lacks competence to consider a request for provisional 
release from an individual who, rather than being on trial in the sense of 
most provisional release requests, has already been finally convicted.82  
 
 4.5. Right to a reasoned judgment 
 
A likely issue to arise in the proceedings before the MICT is the level 
of reasoning on the evidential record required to sustain a Chamber’s 
findings. This is a debate that is very much to the fore in contemporary 
international criminal law practice,83 and we can witness it in the Stanišić 
and Simatović Appeals Judgment, discussed above. There, as shall be re-
called, the Appeals Chamber found the Trial Chamber’s judgment to be 
insufficiently reasoned, but ironically, the dissenting judges found the 
Appeals Chamber’s judgment to be lacking in reasoning. Judge Agius 
criticized the Majority’s decision, saying it ‘neither attempts to conduct a 
 
77 ‘Turkey sentences U.N. war crimes judge on “terrorism” charges: Hague’ Reuters (15 
June 2017) <www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-coup-un-judge-idUSKBN1960XO?il=0>. 
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81 Meron (n 10).   
82 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware (Order to the Government of the Republic of Turkey 
for the Release of Judge Aydin Sefa Akay) MICT-12-29-R (31 January 2017) para 17.  
83 For a detailed discussion, see Y McDermott, ‘Strengthening the Evaluation of 
Evidence in International Criminal Trials’ (2017) 17 Intl Criminal L Rev (forthcoming).  
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review, nor offers any explanation as to how the Trial Chamber’s error 
invalidated its findings with respect to Stanisic’s and Simatovic’s mens 
rea’,84 while Judge Afande’s dissent noted that, ‘instead of making a ho-
listic reading of the Trial Judgment’, the Majority had analysed the Trial 
Chamber’s examination of the evidence ‘in a piecemeal manner’.85 This 
issue is likely to be important as the MICT decides how to evaluate the 
evidence before it at retrial. 
Similarly, some findings of the ICTY Trial Chamber’s judgment in 
Karadžić have been criticized as being perhaps unfounded in the eviden-
tial record. Noting the Chamber’s findings on Karadžić’s conviction for 
genocide in Srebrenica, Marko Milanović noted that:  
 
‘The whole reasoning rests on what inferences can be drawn from 
Karadzic’s contacts with Deronjic. And while it’s clear to me that a rea-
sonable inference is that Karadzic was informed about the killings, it’s 
not as clear that this is the ONLY such reasonable inference, which is 
what the beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard requires. For 
example, the phone conversation with Deronjic could be interpreted as 
Karadzic’s agreement with the forcible removal of the Bosniak males, 
but not necessarily with their extermination.’86 
 
This is an issue that is very likely to arise on appeal before the MICT. 
These examples show that the debate is still very much alive on the level 
of judicial analysis of the evidential record required to sustain a convic-
tion, and the judges of the international criminal tribunals are clearly still 
divided between a preference for holistic or for atomistic approaches to 
the evidence.87 
 
 4.6. Supervision of imprisonment 
 
A final noteworthy issue, which is not a fair trial rights issue per se, 
but is relevant to the rights of the accused in a broad sense, is the super-
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vision of sentences of imprisonment, and broader issues of the future sta-
tus of the MICT as a Tribunal that this issue gives rise to. Article 25(1) of 
the MICT Statute subjects imprisonment by convicted persons in the ter-
ritory of states to the supervision of the Mechanism. It is anticipated that 
some persons convicted by the ICTY, ICTR, and the MICT will still be 
serving their sentences by 2030.88 However, the Mechanism was estab-
lished to operate only for an initial period of four years, from 2012 to 
2016, with reviews on whether to continue to operate the MICT to be 
carried out every two years thereafter.89 At each biennial review, the man-
date of the MICT can be extended for a further two years, unless the 
Security Council decides otherwise.90 Thus, it seems unlikely that the 
Mechanism will still be in existence by the end of the last convicted per-
son’s sentence, leaving a vacuum as to who will monitor and supervise 
sentences of imprisonment in the MICT’s wake. Rule 128 of the MICT 
RPE notes that the Security Council ‘may designate a body to assist it and 
to proceed to supervise the sentences after the Mechanism legally ceases 
to exist’, but the status and character of such a body is far from certain 





The MICT, as an international criminal tribunal, has been subjected 
to surprisingly little scrutiny in the literature, perhaps because it has been 
somewhat overshadowed by its predecessors, the ICTY and ICTR, and 
its contemporaries, including the ICC, to date. This article sought to ad-
dress that lacuna by examining issues surrounding the fairness of pro-
ceedings before the MICT, and to situate the developments of interna-
tional criminal procedure by the Mechanism’s legal framework in con-
text.  
This article argued, first, that the MICT should be expected to reflect 
the highest standards of fairness in the same manner as its predecessors 
have borne this standard-setting function. While some may argue that it 
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is unreasonable to expect the MICT, as a ‘residual’ tribunal, to carry out 
this role, it is clear that the MICT is more than a purely residual judicial 
institution – being established by Security Council Resolution to hold the 
same powers as the ICTY and ICTR, it is best classified as a new interna-
tional criminal tribunal in its own right. Moreover, the MICT has ex-
pressly portrayed itself as an institution that fully respects the rights of 
the accused and reflects ‘best practices’. This argument is further bol-
stered by the MICT’s role in the supervision of referrals to national juris-
dictions, and revoking such referrals if the accused cannot receive a fair 
trial – implicit in this function is the assumption that the MICT itself fully 
respects the rights of the accused.  
This article also examined the major procedural innovations intro-
duced by the MICT. While the Mechanism’s procedural framework is 
closely modeled on those of its predecessors, it has introduced some in-
teresting changes, especially for proceedings against the administration 
of justice, which can be heard by a single judge (a novelty now reflected 
in the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as provisionally 
amended), and which also can be referred to domestic jurisdictions. Fur-
ther, some streamlining in the role of judges can be seen, with single 
judges undertaking some of the functions that would previously have 
been undertaken by full Chambers in the ICTY and ICTR. The provi-
sions on trial in the absence of the accused are an improvement on equiv-
alent protections in the ICTR’s Rules in some respects, in that they intro-
duce additional requirements for proceeding in the absence of the ac-
cused, but are less rights-protective in other ways, including the lack of a 
limiting clause and the introduction of the idea of the accused having 
‘forfeited’ his or her right to be present at trial, without further articula-
tion of what such a forfeit might look like. 
The final part of this article examined the main fair trial issues that 
have arisen in the MICT’s practice to date, or that are likely to arise in 
the future. These included: the consequences for judicial independence 
arising from the arrest and imprisonment of Judge Akay; the insufficien-
cies in funding for defence counsel practicing before the MICT; the is-
sues surrounding retrial, including alleged breaches of the res judicata 
and non bis in idem principles, and the introduction of new evidence by 
the prosecution at retrial; the MICT’s role as a monitor of referrals; issues 
surrounding judicial reasoning, and the continued supervisory role of the 
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MICT over sentences when its mandate is severely time-limited. This ar-
ray of issues highlights the need for international criminal law scholars to 
continue to monitor the law and practice of this unique new tribunal 
closely, and to hold it to account for any deficiencies in its fair trial prac-
tices, as it develops over the coming months and years.  
 
  
